Delivered May 4, 2022

Remarks as Prepared for Delivery

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. As a Penn Law school alumna, I’m
honored to be delivering these remarks here at Penn, although it is a little surreal to be up here on
the stage with Dean Ruger.

Places like Penn and the institutions the export control officers of AUECO represent shape new
generations of entrepreneurs, scientists, engineers, teachers, and yes, lawyers. I am thrilled to
partner with you all to educate all these stakeholders on the importance of export controls.

While the U.S. higher education system is the crown jewel of our open society, it is also a front
line in protecting our national security.

We face real threats to the principles of rule of law and democracy around the world. And we
strive to ensure that U.S. innovation does not benefit adversaries who seek to undermine those
values.

Consider the ongoing, brutal Russian assault on Ukraine. Underlying that senseless war is
Vladimir Putin’s warped sense of grievance against Ukraine and disregard for the free, open,
rules-based order.

Also consider Xi Jinping’s rejection of democratic values and human rights, not just in Xinjiang
and Tibet, but across China’s population, not to mention its military-civil fusion strategy and
military expansion across the region. Our strategic competition with the People’s Republic of
China is one of the defining challenges of our time.

We reject the notion that going the way of state-run kleptocracy and ethno-nationalism based on
repression and human rights abuses is a viable path for any nation to take. Our challenge is to
demonstrate that our principles of tolerance, respect for human rights, and the rule of law, are the                          surest paths to long-term prosperity for every nation. That challenge has only gotten bigger in
recent years as commercial technologies have become more sophisticated.

The phones that we have in our pockets are tremendously powerful tools. They can take amazing
pictures of our family—or become tools of surveillance and repression.
We are seeing this link between commercial technologies and national security play out in
Ukraine, where semiconductors produced by Western firms have turned up in Russian military
drones and other applications.

More and more, this link between commercial technology and national security requires us to
think about how technological breakthroughs and innovation will operate outside the lab, in the
worst-case scenario.

You may be aware of the criminal case against Xu Yanjun in Ohio – he was a Chinese
intelligence officer tasked with obtaining jet engine technology from a U.S. company. Or the
case against Mozaffar Khazaee in Connecticut – while working for U.S. defense contractors,
Khazaee obtained controlled U.S. technology, which he sought to take to Iran, in part to aid him
in finding work at an Iranian state-owned technical university.

It’s true that industry and academia require different approaches to export controls, and the Xu
and Khazaee cases are examples of technology that was held by private companies, not research
institutions.

But these cases also show that when foreign countries cannot legally obtain U.S. technology,
they will resort to whatever means necessary.

There is no distinction between industry and academia for a procurement agent.

Let me also draw your attention to the risks associated with collaboration with unvetted foreign
institutions. We value, and we know that your faculty and researchers value, international
collaboration. How would they feel, though, to know their science and engineering support a
military program contrary to U.S. national security? Attacks on innocent civilians? A
government mass surveillance program? Human rights abuses? For your faculty and
researchers, these are not just national security, but also ethical concerns. And how about the
reputational risk to your institutions of being associated with a program engaged in these
activities?

The AUECO website poses the question, “Why do U.S. universities need to worry about export
controls?” I respectfully suggest that the answer is not – or at least isn’t solely – that
unauthorized exports can result in fines and jail time.

Rather, universities should cooperate with export controls because export controls protect
innovation and national security.

Controlling exports, of course, is not the same as cutting off exports. Export controls on a
technology enable us to look at the destination, end use, and end user involved in a collaboration.

This gives us insight into whether such exports or collaborators are a U.S. national security concern. They help you and your faculty and researchers do the due diligence to protect you
from exposure to the concerns I know we share.

Our job – yours and mine – is to make sure that American innovation is protected. Protected
from use in shocking human rights abuses, military attacks on innocent civilians, and theft by
those who seek to illicitly procure what they can’t obtain within the bounds of the law, certainly
without regard to intellectual property rights.

Even research that appears inherently civilian may have national security implications. And I am
grateful to you for making your faculty and researchers aware of these concerns.
Why this is relevant to you, and the higher education system writ large, is that the academic
community is a critical partner in our efforts.

I am here today to thank you for your help in this effort and to ask for deeper collaboration
between us. A strong relationship between the Bureau of Industry and Security and the
institutions you represent is essential to ensuring U.S. national security, including long-term
technological leadership.

I would be shocked if you told me that your institution does not engage in international
collaboration.
But we at BIS know that there is no one size fits all approach for academia. Some of your
institutions focus only on fundamental research. Others operate classified labs working at the
cutting edge of military technology. And many operate somewhere in between.

Different institutions have different needs and different challenges.

We are trying to better understand how we can help you support your institutions. We want to
provide better resources and support, tailored to the issues that keep you – the compliance
officers – up at night.

To this end, when BIS issued a survey to AUECO membership in 2020. We received great
feedback from many of you all about how BIS can help. I’d like to hear from more of you,
though. Given how different your institutions are, we want to know how we can address your
different needs.

In fact, you can provide that feedback right after I’m done. As I know has already been
mentioned by other BIS speakers this week, copies of BIS’s survey are available at the
registration desk. I’d ask you to please fill these out and return them to the same location. I will
be reviewing the survey results to assess how we can better engage with academia. Thank you in
advance for your participation in this information-gathering.

Let me also point you to the resources we have made available for you to use in your individual
institutions.

The BIS website provides short videos on topics including deemed exports, how to classify items
subject to the EAR, license exceptions, and reexports and offshore transactions. These videos                                      are designed to be short introductions on their topics and may be useful to you as you train your
colleagues.

We also developed an academia-specific export controls brochure for you to share with your
community members. I heard that the brochure was provided to some of you at an event last
year. Thanks to AUECO and Penn, we are able to make it available to the rest of you through
the link posted on the slide. Note that BIS designed this brochure for you, as ECOs, to provide
to faculty and researchers who may be less knowledgeable about export controls. We welcome
your feedback on how we can better tailor our message, starting with how our national security
message can best resonate in your institutions.

Export Control Officers are indeed the front line in our export controls, and we want to support
you as you protect our national security. Please help us understand your challenges, needs, and
how we can best help.

Let me change gears for a minute and mention a concrete area where we seek your help and that
of your faculty.

As you know, the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) Congress enacted in 2018 specifically
identified BIS’s responsibilities for reviewing and controlling emerging and foundational
technologies.

We were already doing this as part of our regular proposals for new controls to the multilateral
regimes. ECRA gave this work a new boost, and BIS has strived since August 2018 to cast a
wide net for emerging and foundational technologies that are not already identified in the Export
Administration Regulations and ought to be.

I recognize that there is some controversy surrounding this area. Some claim BIS has not
defined what emerging and foundational technologies are, has not acted fast enough, and hasn’t
been willing to act unilaterally. Others criticize the notion of controlling emerging technologies
at all because such action will harm innovation.

Let me be clear. If a technology poses a risk to national security, BIS controls it.

That may be because of the inherent nature of the technology or because of the risk of it falling
into the wrong hands. We are responsive to national security threats posted by new technologies
and innovations of old technologies, whether or not we formally identified the technologies as
“emerging” and “foundational.”

Shortly after ECRA’s enactment, we published a list of 14 general technology categories and
invited comment on what types of items, applications, technologies pose a national security
threat. For your reference, those areas are:
(1) Biotechnology;
(2) Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning technology;
(3) Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) technology;
(4) Microprocessor technology;                                                                                                                                             (5) Advanced computing technology;
(6) Data analytics technology;
(7) Quantum information and sensing technology;
(8) Logistics technology;
(9) Additive manufacturing;
(10) Robotics;
(11) Brain-computer interfaces;
(12) Hypersonics;
(13) Advanced Materials; and
(14) Advanced surveillance technologies.

Over the last 3½ years, we have imposed 38 new technology controls we identified as emerging
or foundational under Section 1758 of ECRA.

All but one of these controls were established through multilateral regimes, meaning that U.S.
exporters and their counterparts in other major economies of the world faced the same export
controls.

We know from your industry counterparts that multilateral export controls help maintain a level
playing field. In the academia context, this means collaboration with partner country institutions
is easier.

I’d also note that in identifying emerging and foundational technologies, ECRA requires us to
consider:
• The development of emerging and foundational technologies in foreign countries;
• The effect export controls may have on the development of such technologies in the
   United States; and
• The effectiveness of export controls on limiting the proliferation of emerging and
foundational technologies in foreign countries of concern.

As you can see, our mandate under ECRA starts with national security, but also directs us to be
thoughtful and to carefully tailor controls.

We must get this right. To do so requires technical understanding, including the benefits and
concerns associated with specific technology. And it requires acting in a tailored, targeted way
to protect national security while supporting American technological leadership.

I’d ask for your help with this effort.

Given the widespread threats we face, we can’t have our academic institutions, researchers, and
faculty stick their heads in the sand and reflexively hold that all controls are bad for innovation.

Carefully tailored export controls support innovation.    

They encourage due diligence with respect to partnerships—That will help to protect intellectual
property and ensure that partners with whom your faculty and researchers seek to collaborate
won’t divert research to dangerous ends.
Consider nuclear technology. We have a well-developed and understood regime for control of
nuclear technologies. This helps to protect our national security—not to mention global security.
Yet, we still see nuclear technology innovation in energy and health care, among other civilian,
commercial industries.
Certainly, not all our 14 identified emerging technology sectors will end up with the kind of
robust, multilateral regulatory regime that nuclear technology has.
But the risk of failing to think through the national security concerns of new technologies is real.
Developing technologies without considering how they may be applied outside the lab is
reckless. Failure to consider the guardrails – based on national security, ethics, and values – that
we need to establish during the development process can have serious consequences.
Let me share an example in the biotechnology field.
Biotechnology and life sciences are areas of amazing technology potential. But technology is
value neutral. It’s people who determine how that technology will be used and in what
applications.
Last year BIS asked for public comments on a control we were considering on brain computer
interface (BCI) technology.
We received 18 comments, the general thrust of which was: Don’t regulate or you’ll kill
innovation.
The potential applications of BCI technology are many, and their impact could be profound.
Around the same time that we closed the comment period on our BCI notice, BIS added a series
of parties to our Entity List for attempting to develop and deploy biotechnology and other
technologies for military applications and human rights abuses.
We added the Chinese Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS) and eleven of its
research institutions to the Entity List, according to the Federal Register Notice:
“…based on the body of information that AMMS and its eleven research institutes use
biotechnology processes to support Chinese military end uses and end users, to include
purported brain-control weaponry. This activity is contrary to U.S. national security and
foreign policy interests . . .”
“Brain-control weaponry” sounds a lot different from BCI technology.
I understand the initial instinct behind the commenters’ responses to our request for comments
on BCI technology. But an outright condemnation of export controls is not tenable given the
potential for the technology’s nefarious uses. 

Your faculty and researchers are likely focused on collaborating with the best minds in their
fields. Are they thinking about who else is interested in the technology, and the worst-case
scenarios? Export controls will help them do that.

We’re on the precipice of tremendous technological advancement in many of the labs and
research facilities you oversee, and we need your help.

I hope that I’ve illustrated that BIS’s concerns are tangible and real, that the responsibility for
protecting national security is shared, and that you are valued partners. I thank you for your
critical role in raising awareness of export controls and doing your part to create a more secure
and prosperous future.

You have an important job, and BIS wants to help you do it, because we will all benefit.

Before I close, let me share a personal observation with you.
I grew up in an academic community, the daughter of a professor whose career was based on
international collaboration. My family lived overseas when my father had a sabbatical year at a
Japanese university. I understand the value of global education and research. And I share the
view that the openness of U.S. universities makes them second to none.

BIS is your partner, and my door is open to you and the specific issues facing your institution.

We have shared interests and responsibilities. Protecting national security. Supporting the next
generation—of people, and of technologies.

Thank you.

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